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I.

INTRODUCTION

No policy designed to prevent firearm violence is more popular
than mandatory sentence enhancements for gun crimes. By providing stiff and certain penalties when a gun is involved in an offense,
sentence enhancement laws' promise to reduce the use of firearms
by criminals. Because the laws apply only when a crime is committed, they impose no direct costs on legitimate gun owners. Opinion
polls find that a large majority of the public favors mandatory sentence enhancements, and more than half the states have adopted
them. 2 If these laws deliver their expected crime preventive effects,
they are an especially attractive approach to regulating the use of
firearms.
We previously conducted case studies to estimate the preventive effects of mandatory sentencing on firearm offenses in Detroit,
Jacksonville, Tampa and Miami.3 Based on the findings of these
* Portions of this research were supported by National Institute ofJustice award 84IJ-CX-0044. Computer time was provided by the University of Maryland Computer
Science Center.
** Members of the Violence Research Group of the Institute of Criminal Justice and
Criminology, University of Maryland at College Park.
I Examples include: HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-660.1 (1985 & Supp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2, II-b
(1986 & Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-14-12 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.125 (West 1988).
2 SeeJAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 235 (1983); Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms, Violence and Public Policy, 265 SC. AM.
48, 52 (1991).
3 The Detroit research is reported in Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and
FirearmsViolence: Evaluatingan Alternative to Gun Control, 17 LAW & Soc'v REV. 287 (1983),
and in Colin Loftin & David McDowall "One With A Gun Gets You Two ".Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Violence in Detroit, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 150 (1981)
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earlier studies, we concluded there was little evidence that sentence
enhancement laws are successful in reducing violent crime. More
recently, we completed similar studies in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh (Allegheny County), Pennsylvania. In this paper, we pool together the individual results to obtain a combined estimate of the
impact of the laws. The pooled results lead to very different conclusions from the city-specific case studies. The analyzed data suggest
that the mandatory sentencing laws substantially reduced the
number of homicides; however, any effects on assault and robbery
are not conclusive because they cannot be separated from imprecision and random error in the data.
Part II of this article describes the earlier case studies. Part III
explains the methodology for combining the individual results and
presents the pooled estimates. Part IV discusses our interpretation
of the findings and Part V provides suggestions for future research.
II.
A.

CASE STUDIES

MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS IN THREE STATES

Our analysis is based on six city-specific case studies, which
monitored the effects of mandatory sentencing on violent crime in
Detroit, Jacksonville, Tampa, Miami, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.
The key features of the laws were the same in each area. 4 First, each
law required judges to impose a specified sentence on defendants
convicted of an offense involving a gun. Second, mitigating devices
such as probation, suspended sentences and parole were prohibited.
In theory, all sentences specified by the laws had to be served in full.
[hereinafter Loftin & McDowall, One With a Gun]. The Florida studies are reported in
Colin Loftin & David McDowall, The DeterrentEffects of the FloridaFelony FirearmLaw, 75J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250 (1984) [hereinafter Loftin & David McDowall, The Deterrent
Effects]. The effect of the Detroit law on the processing of court cases is also evaluated in
Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining:
The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 393 (1979).
4 Specifically, the Florida law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.087(2) (West 1976 & Supp.
1992), required a three-year sentence for persons convicted of committing any of 12
specified felonies while in possession of a firearm. The law went into effect on October
1, 1975. Michigan's law, MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.227b (West 1991 & Supp.
1992), went into effect on January 1, 1977. It mandated a two-year sentence for the
possession of a firearm while committing any felony. Pennsylvania's law, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9712-9714 (1982), adopted in June 1982, required a five-year minimum
sentence for any of seven violent crimes if (1) the offense was committed with visible
possession of a firearm; (2) the defendant had been convicted of the same offense within
the past seven years; or (3) the crime was committed in or near public transportation
facilities. In Florida and Michigan, the mandatory sentences were to be served consecutively to the sentence for the triggering felony. In all three states, suspended, deferred
and withheld sentences were explicitly prohibited, and parole was not possible until the
firearm sentence was served.
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Finally, all three states used advertising campaigns involving radio
and television commercials, posters, bumper stickers and billboards
to communicate the message that offenders would receive additional
punishment if they used a gun to commit a crime. The laws are
therefore similar enough in purpose and content that they can be
regarded as replications of approximately the same experiment.
B.

DESIGN OF THE CASE STUDIES

Each earlier city-specific case study used an interrupted time series research design 5 that compared the level of violent crime before
and after the statutes were adopted. This comparison provides an
estimate of the aggregate preventive effect of the announcement of
the laws. 6 If the laws were effective in reducing firearm crimes, the
number of gun offenses should decrease in the post-intervention
period.
To further strengthen the basis for causal inference, our design
incorporates several other features. First, to increase the precision
of the estimates in each city, we examined long, monthly pre-intervention series (54 to 150 months) for three violent crimes: homi7
cides, assaults and robberies.
Second, because the statutes apply specifically to gun crimes,
we analyzed companion series of gun offenses and non-gun offenses.8 This additional analysis narrows the range of extraneous
5 See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN

207-32 (1979).
represent the net influence of deterrence, incapacitation and
other preventive mechanisms. Because we cannot model individual behavior, it is not
possible to isolate the specific mechanisms that might be responsible for an observed
change in crime. This places some limits on the conclusions that can be drawn, but it is
offset by the fact that the interrupted time series is among the strongest quasi-experiAND ANALYSIS

ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS

6 The results thus

mental designs. JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 29-93 (1975) pro-

vides an extensive discussion of the mechanisms through which a legal change might
influence criminal behavior.
7 The length of each pre-intervention series was dictated by data availability. In
Detroit, the pre-intervention series included 96 monthly observations for homicides and
120 monthly observations for assaults and robberies. There were 93 monthly pre-intervention observations for all crimes in each of the three Florida cities. For homicides in
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, the pre-intervention series included 150 monthly observations. For assaults and robberies in the state of Pennsylvania, there were 54 monthly
pre-intervention observations.
8 In Florida, data for robbery and assault were drawn from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Return A tapes for January 1968 through December 1980 (156 monthly
observations). Florida homicide data were taken from the UCR's Supplementary Homicide Report tapes forJanuary 1968 through December 1978 (132 observations). In Detroit, robberies and assaults from January 1967 through December 1979 (156
observations) were taken from the Detroit Police Department's Computerized Monthly
Reports. Detroit homicides were collected from Vital Statistics data tapes provided by
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variables that could be confounded with the intervention. Another
causal variable would be confounded with the law only if it influenced gun and non-gun crimes differently, and if it changed markedly at the intervention point. The contrast between the gun and
non-gun series is also helpful in identifying displacement or substitution effects. Outcomes of this type would occur if offenders
switched from guns to other weapons after the laws were
implemented. 9
Third, systematic within-series variation (nonstationarity and
autocorrelation) was removed from each series using an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) noise model.10 If the
noise model is correctly specified, it will account for causes of violent crime (poverty, age structure, etc.) that operate consistently
throughout a series. Unless these other variables change in an unusual way at the time of the intervention-a threat that Cook and
Campbell call "history"-the noise model cannot explain an observed impact. I'
After an appropriate noise model was separately developed for
each series, an intervention model was added to represent the effects of the gun law. 12 We considered three types of intervention
models: an abrupt permanent change model, a gradual permanent
the Michigan Department of Public Health for January 1969 through December 1978

(120 observations). The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency provided
state-level robbery and assault data forJanuary 1978 through December 1984 (84 observations), and the Pennsylvania Department of Health supplied homicide data for Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) and the city of Philadelphia for January 1970 through
December 1984 (180 observations).
All the homicide series are defined similarly: the number of gun homicides versus
the number of homicides by other means. Because robberies were defined only as
"armed" and "unarmed" in the Uniform Crime Reporting program prior to 1975, all
the robbery series, except those for Pennsylvania, are the number of armed and the
number of unarmed robberies. In Pennsylvania, it was possible to distinguish gun robberies from robberies with other weapons. The Detroit and Pennsylvania assault series
are defined as gun assaults versus assaults by other means. In Florida, gun assaults are
compared to knife assaults.
9 Substitution effects have been reported in similar contexts. *See, e.g., Lee R.
McPheters et al., Economic Response to a Crime Deterrence Program:Mandatory Sentencing for
Robbery with a Firearm, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 550 (1984); Glenn L. Pierce & William J. Bowers, The Bartley-Fox Gun Law's Short-Term Impact on Crime in Boston, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 120 (1981); and Charles L. Rich et al., Guns and Suicide: Possible Effects of
Some Specific Legislation, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 342 (1990).
10 G. E. P. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL
(1976).
11 COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 5, at 211.
12 G. E. P. Box & G. C. Tiao, A Change in Level of a Non-Stationary Time-Series, 52 BiOMETRIKA 181 (1965); G. E. P. Box & G. C. Tiao, Intervention Analysis with Applications to
Economic and EnvironmentalProblems, 70J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 70 (1975).
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change model and an abrupt temporary change model.' 3 For each
series, the abrupt permanent change model provided the best fit to
the data.14
C.

RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDIES

The results of the city-specific case studies are summarized in
Table 1 (homicides), Table 2 (assaults) and Table 3 (robberies). 1 5
The intervention coefficient for each offense, Oo, represents the
change in the number of monthly crime reports following the announcement of the statutes. The analyses for Detroit and the three
Florida cities are presented in detail elsewhere, 16 and our major interest is in combining the estimates. Therefore, the individual case
studies are only briefly discussed here.
In Detroit, there was a statistically significant decrease in gun
homicides, but no significant change in any other offense. We concluded from this study that the results best fit a model in which the
mandatory sentencing law did not have a preventive effect on
crime. 17 Similarly, in Florida, there were significant decreases in
Tampa gun homicides and Jacksonville gun assaults. Unarmed robberies increased significantly in Tampa and Miami, but armed robberies did not change. In addition, there was a significant increase
in Tampa gun assaults. Again, we concluded that the results did not
18
support a preventive effect model.
Alone, the Pennsylvania estimates do not strongly challenge the
conclusion that the statutes have no preventive effect. There were
statistically significant decreases in gun homicides in both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. The decrease in Philadelphia gun homicides was mirrored by a reduction in non-gun homicides, however,
13 See DAVID McDOWALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS (1980) for

details.
14 See id. at 83-85 for the criteria used to select the best-fitting model.
15 An appendix that describes the intervention analyses in more detail is available
from the authors. Since the studies were originally conducted over several years using a
variety of computer programs and machines, we have re-estimated the models to verify
the results in a common computing environment. All of the series were re-estimated
using BMDP88's P2T algorithm on an IBM 3081 running VM/CMS Release 5. Variations in the computing environments are responsible for most differences from previously published estimates, but an error in the earlier analysis is responsible for a change
in Jacksonville gun assaults.
16 Loftin et al., supra note 3; Loftin & McDowall, One With a Gun, supra note 3; Loftin
& McDowall, The Deterrent Effects, supra note 3.
17 Loftin et al., supra note 3, at 309-10; Loftin & McDowall, One With a Gun, supra note
3, at 162.
18 Loftin & McDowall, The Deterrent Effects, supra note 3, at 256-57.
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and there was no change in gun assaults or robberies in the state of
Pennsylvania.
Although the results of the case studies are complex, no individual study provides clear support for the proposition that
mandatory sentencing reduces firearm violence. If the studies are
considered together, however, the no-effect conclusion is less certain. This is especially so for homicide. Gun homicides decreased
in all six of the cities, significantly in four (Detroit, Tampa, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia) and insignificantly in two (Jacksonville and
Miami). The argument for a preventive effect is stronger when the
three crimes are compared across cities than when the findings for
each city are examined separately.
The immediate goal in each city-specific case study was to obtain an unbiased estimate of the policy's impact in a given area. Yet
the ultimate objective was not simply to describe what happened at a
particular site, but rather to predict what would occur if other cities
enacted mandatory sentencing statutes for gun crimes.
From this point of view, each city-specific case study represents
a sample observation drawn from a population of studies that could
be conducted under similar circumstances. If the effects of
mandatory sentencing vary with features unique to a site's setting or
law, a single case may provide an untrustworthy basis for inference.
A more desirable approach would be to combine the results from
several replications. An estimate based on combining several sites
would be less sensitive to the characteristics of any particular area,
and it would more precisely measure the expected impact in the
population.
III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

To estimate the combined impact of the laws, we pooled the
results from the six cities. This analysis treats the impact-estimate
for each city as an observation from a distribution of possible responses to mandatory sentencing laws. The major motivation for
pooling is to obtain an overall estimate of the effect of the statutes
on each type of crime. Pooling, however, has other advantages as
well. First, in conjunction with the case study designs, pooling
makes it extremely unlikely that the estimates are confounded with
other variables. Second, the pooled data make it possible to measure variation in the response across cities. Finally, pooling increases statistical power and efficiency, allowing the influence of the
laws to be determined more precisely.
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PROCEDURES USED FOR THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

We obtained a combined estimate of the effect of the statutes
on each type of violent crime using statistical methods developed
for synthesizing the results from multiple studies. 19 Since the level
of crime varies greatly among the cities, we first standardized the
individual estimates by dividing each intervention coefficient by the
standard deviation of its error term:

Here, co0j is the estimate of the change in a crime for cityj; dj is the
standardized estimate of the change; and RMSEj is the residual
mean square error from the intervention model.
Standardization is necessary because the cities vary greatly in
the number of violent crimes per month. For example, a decrease
of ten gun homicides has a different meaning in Detroit than it
would in Jacksonville. Many more homicides occur each month in
Detroit than in Jacksonville, and an unweighted comparison of
crime counts in the two cities would be misleading. The standardized effects measure the change in crime attributable to the intervention, expressed in standard deviation units.
To pool the individual standardized effects for each offense, we
used a variance components model. This model is most easily understood by comparing it with a simpler approach, called a fixed
effects model. The fixed effects model involves computing the mean
of the standardized coefficients for each crime. The fixed effects
model can be written as:
dj = y + e

ej - N(O,V)

In the fixed effects model, y measures the change in crime attributable to the laws, and ej is a random error term. The ei vary from city
to city because only a portion of the time series process generating
crime is observed. The ej are assumed to be distributed Normally
with a mean of zero and a variance of V.
The fixed effects model is limited by assuming a common impact, y, that holds across all cities. In other words, after removing
random errors in sampling over time, the effect of the laws on a
particular type of crime is identical in each area. This is probably
19 This type of synthesis is often referred to as a "meta-analysis."

ods

we use are

described in

The specific meth-

LARRY V. HEDGES & INGRAM OLKIN, STATISTICAL METHODS

FOR META-ANALYSIS 189-203 (1985), and Stephen W. Raudenbush & Anthony S. Bryk,
EmpiricalBayes Meta-Analysis, 10J. EDUC. STAT. 75 (1985).
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unrealistic. More likely, the effects will vary because of differences
in the details of the laws, implementation, publicity and other factors specific to a given setting. In this case, there will be a distribution of effects instead of one common impact.
The variance components model that we estimate incorporates
the site-specific effects. The variance components model can be
written as:
d = , + e
81 = yt + uj

ej, -N(O,V)
uj - N(O, T)

or:

d=y

+uj+ej

In the variance components model, y may be interpreted as the
average effect of the laws. No city may actually experience this average effect because the impact will vary from one setting to another
depending on local conditions. The value for -y is a meaningful
quantity, however, because it provides an estimate of the change in
crime across the population of cities. In other words, holding
unique characteristics and random error constant, -yis the expected
impact of the announcement of the laws.
Besides the average impact, the variance components model
provides an estimate of the dispersion of the effects across settings
(r). The larger the value of r, the larger the expected variation in
the effects. If r is equal to zero, the variance components model
reduces to a fixed effects model.
To estimate the variance components model, it is necessary to
make an assumption about the probability distribution from which
the site-unique effects are drawn. Following conventional practice,
we assume that the operation of numerous random variables will
generate a Normal distribution of effects. Given this assumption,
the variance components model can be estimated in a variety of
ways. We used an empirical Bayes algorithm developed by
20
Raudenbush and Bryk.
The analysis will allow us to select among three general theoretical models of community response to the announcement of the
sentencing laws. If the reported number of gun crimes declines after the laws are implemented, and there is no similar decline in
crimes without guns, then the data fit a preventive effect model. An
20

Raudenbush & Bryk, supra note 19. The algorithms are available in

BRYK ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO

HLM:

COMPUTER PROGRAM AND USERS'

ANTHONY S.

GUIDE (1989)

(manual and software distributed as HLM DistributionPackage Version 2.20, April 1991, for
DOS 3 and later, by Scientific Software, Inc., 1525 E. 53rd St., Suite 906, Chicago, Ill.
60615). We also assume that the replications are independent. Because cities from the
same state are included in the analysis, this is probably only approximately correct.
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increase in non-gun crimes and a decrease (or an increase of smaller
magnitude) in gun offenses would be compatible with both a preventive effect model and a weapon substitution model. While
weapon substitution may influence the pattern of injuries resulting
from crimes, it will not reduce the total number of offenses that are
committed. Other outcomes favor a model in which there is no preventive effect. The no effect model, like the preventive effect model,
subsumes several different micro-level processes. Most notably, it
does not distinguish between the case where the policy produces no
change in sanctions and the case where a change in sanctions does
not influence criminal behavior.
B.

RESULTS OF THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The pooled analysis for homicides (Table 1) provides exceptionally strong support for the preventive effect model. The intervention estimates (c 0 ) for gun homicides are negative in all six cities
and statistically significant in Detroit, Tampa, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. The estimate of the average standardized effect (y) is .69.
This implies that the expected reduction in gun homicides is about
21
two-thirds of a standard deviation.
To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, we can reverse the
standardization procedure and express the reduction in terms of the
number of homicides rather than in standardized units. For example, consider Detroit, a city with a pre-intervention mean of forty
gun homicides per month and a standard deviation of eight. Here, a
decrease of .69 standard deviation units represents an average of
5.5 lives saved each month, a fourteen percent reduction.
In contrast, there was little change in non-gun homicides. The
signs of the intervention effects were positive in four cities (Detroit,
Jacksonville, Tampa and Miami) and negative in two (Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh). While the decrease in Philadelphia non-gun homicides was statistically significant, it was smaller than the reduction in
homicides committed with a gun. The average standardized effect
across all the cities is only -. 03. It is hard to imagine data that
would fit the preventive effect model better than these series.
Table 2 describes a similar analysis for assaults. 2 2 In this case,
21 A rule of thumb, suggested in JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 24-27 (rev. ed. 1977), is that standardized effects of 0.2 may be
regarded as small, 0.5 as medium and 0.8 as large. By these guidelines, the impact on
gun homicides is substantial.
22 The assault series consist of aggravated assaults as defined by the Uniform Crime
Reporting program: "Aggravated assault is an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of as-
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the fit to the crime preventive model is poor. Gun assaults decreased significantly in Jacksonville, but they increased significantly
in Tampa. Although there were also decreases in gun assaults in
Detroit, Miami and the state of Pennsylvania, they were not large
enough to be statistically significant. The average standardized
change in gun offenses is small (y = - .36) and not significantly
different from zero. Other weapon assaults did not change appreciably in any of the areas, and the average standardized impact of
-. 06 is also statistically insignificant. The results, therefore, provide little solid evidence of a reduction in gun assaults that can be
attributed to the statutes.
As with assaults, the robbery23 data, presented in Table 3, do
not fit the preventive effect model well. Armed robberies did not
decrease significantly in any area following the introduction of the
laws; in fact, the intervention coefficients are negative for only two
of the five series. The estimate of y is .08 and not statistically significant. For unarmed robbery, however, there were two cities, Tampa
and Miami, that experienced large and significant increases following the laws' adoption. The average effect across all cities for unarmed robbery is a significant increase of two-thirds of a standard
deviation. At best, one might argue that the sentencing laws prevented armed robberies from increasing in the same way as unarmed robberies.
The estimates of-r measure the amount of variation in the standardized effects across the cities. Chi-square tests2 4 led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of zero variation in the effects for each
crime. We conclude, therefore, that the impact of the laws differs
from one setting to another. Because of this variation, the experience of any single city may not be an accurate guide to the average
effect across the population of cities as a whole.

IV.

DisCUSSION

The results are a logical puzzle because different conclusions
are reached depending on the weight given to the homicide data as
sault is usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce death
or great bodily harm. Attempts are included .. " See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 22 (1989). For Pennsylvania, we
analyzed assaults for the entire state because weapon-specific monthly data were not
available for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.
23 The robbery series are defined according to the conventions of the Uniform Crime
Reporting program: "Robbery is the taking or attempting to take anything of value
from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or
violence and/or by putting the victim in fear." Id. at 17.
24 HEDGES & OLKIN, supra note 19, at 197-98.
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opposed to the data for robbery and assault. In interpreting the earlier case studies in Detroit and the three Florida cities, we placed
equal emphasis on each type of crime. The homicide estimates fit
the prevention model in Detroit and Tampa, but the estimates for
the other offenses were not consistent with a preventive effect. Because of this apparent irreconcilability, we attributed the homicide
findings to chance and concluded that the data best fit the no effect
model. That preliminary conclusion is now at odds with the results
of the pooled homicide analysis.
It is not possible to select a single model if each type of crime is
equally weighted. That is, across the three offenses, the findings are
incompatible with both the preventive effect model and the no effect
model. The consistency of the effects on gun homicide virtually
rules out the possibility that factors confounded with mandatory
sentencing could account for the reductions in this crime. Such an
explanation would require that confounded factors reduce gun
homicides, but not other types of homicides, in different years and
in six different cities. Therefore, the accumulating evidence forces
us to reject the no effect model as a general explanation of the results. There is clear and convincing evidence of preventive effects
for homicide.
At the same time, the preventive effect model does not adequately fit the robbery and assault data. This result is perplexing
because a reduction in homicides caused by the laws should be accompanied by a more general decrease in gun violence. In a sense,
homicide is not a separate offense; it is a measure of the severity of
injury associated with other assaultive crimes. Accordingly, one
would not expect a mandatory sentencing law for gun offenses to
have an effect on homicides without influencing either assaults or
robberies.
Faced with this pattern of outcomes, it is necessary to consider
a wider range of explanations. The simplest alternative is to assume
that homicides are more completely and accurately reported than
robberies and assaults. As a result, the effect of the laws is detected
for homicide, but lost in the noise of the less sensitive robbery and
assault series.
There is independent reason to believe that the homicide data
are more precise than the data for robberies and assaults. First,
homicides are uniformly serious, and they command attention in reporting and recording. 25 Variation in the seriousness of the other
25 See Michael J. Hindelang, The Uniform Crime Reports Revisited, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 1
(1974).
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offenses produces discretion in reporting, and there is less consistency over time or between jurisdictions in recording practices. 26
Second, our experience in modeling the robbery and assault data
suggests inconsistent and erratic patterns of recording. The homicide series were easy to model and the noise components were simple and fit well. The assault and robbery series, on the other hand,
required complex models whose fit was relatively poor. This outcome would be expected in the presence of irregular shifts in the
recording process. Finally, the Uniform Crime Reports did not permit us to distinguish between robbery offenses with and without
guns. Accordingly, we compared armed with unarmed robberies for
Detroit, Tampa, Jacksonville and Miami, and this necessarily introduced imprecision in the estimates. These considerations lead us to
the working hypothesis that mandatory sentencing laws have a preventive effect on homicide, and probably on other gun crimes as
well. However, the available data contain measurement errors that
mask the preventive effects on assault and, perhaps, robbery.
Beyond the substantive findings, the analysis also illustrates the
desirability of using replications to identify variation in the effects of
a legal innovation in different areas. There is evidence that features
of the local setting affected the magnitude of the preventive effects.
The impact of the laws on homicide was negative in all the cities that
we studied, but it varied greatly from case to case. If there were a
measure of data quality (or any other factor that might explain the
variation), it could be included in the variance components model. 2 7
Such measures are not available, however, and any explanation of
the heterogeneity remains speculative.
Although the comparative analysis cannot account for the variation across cities, it shows the importance of considering these differences in studying the influence of the laws. Each case study
provided an unbiased estimate of the impact of the law in a particular jurisdiction. Yet if areas differ in characteristics related to the
law, individual estimates are of relatively limited value. These estimates will be drawn from a probability distribution of possible ef26 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, at 154-56 for a summary of sources of error in the
UCR data. For some of the sources of error, see Richard Block & Carolyn R. Block,
Decisions and Data: The Transformation of Robbery Incidents into Official Robbery Statistics, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 622 (1980); Richard McCleary et al., Uniform Crime Reports as
OrganizationalOutcomes: Three Time Series Experiments, 29 Soc. PROBS. 361 (1982); Victoria
W. Schneider & Brian Wiersema, Limits and Use of the Uniform Crime Reports, in MEASURING
CRIME: LARGE-SCALE, LONG-RANGE EFFORTS 21 (D. L. MacKenzie et al. eds., 1990); and
David Seidman & Michael Couzens, Getting the Crime Rate Down: PoliticalPressureand Crime
Reporting, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 457 (1974).
27 See Raudenbush & Bryk, supra note 19, at 88-93.
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fects, and a single case will be inadequate to characterize the
population response.
Because of heterogeneous effects, crime might even increase in
some settings despite a strongly negative average impact in the population. For example, we found a mean decrease in gun homicides
of .69 standardized units following the introduction of the laws.
The variance of the estimates was .22, however, implying substantial
differences from one city to another. Because of the dispersion, any
city with an impact-estimate more than 1.47 standardized units
above the mean would register an increase in gun homicides following the law. 28 Given that the effects are drawn from a Normal distri-

bution, increases of this type would be expected about seven
percent of the time. If one examined a single city and was unfortunate enough to select such a case, it would appear that the laws were
responsible for higher levels of homicide.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

There is reason for both confidence and caution in our findings.
The confidence follows from the strength of the research design and
the quality of the homicide data. The consistency of the homicide
estimates across the six locations requires that we modify our earlier
conclusions. The only plausible interpretation of the results is that
the reductions in gun homicides are due to the announcement of
the laws. Since there were no compensating increases in the
number of homicides committed with weapons other than guns,
these effects can be interpreted as truly preventive of homicides.
For reasons that we cannot directly evaluate, the robbery and
assault series do not reflect the preventive effects. It seems likely,
however, that this result is due to a lack of precision in the data.
Assault and robbery may respond to the policy in different ways, but
we cannot distinguish between the no effect model and measurement errors in these crimes.
There are several reasons for caution in interpreting the results.
First, despite the powerful research design, the estimate of the average impact is probably not very precise. This is because only six
cities were examined, and substantial heterogeneity existed in the
size of the intervention coefficients. There is little doubt that the
average effect is negative, at least for homicides. However, addi28 That is, D-(-.69) = 1.47.
V.2
.7
Any impact estimate more than 1.47 standard deviations above the mean of the distribution will therefore be positive in sign.
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tional research is necessary to identify characteristics of the organizational environment and conditions of implementation that explain
the variation in the impacts.
Second, we did not examine a probability sample of cities that
have instituted mandatory sentencing laws. The cities were selected
fortuitously as our interest in the topic progressed. We began with
Detroit because it was convenient. We then examined Florida because news reports suggested that its law had reduced gun homicides. Pennsylvania was added because its law was enacted and
widely publicized while we were working on the issue. The sample
is thus composed of areas in which the policy change was heavily
advertised, and inferences should be limited accordingly. Future research should select a probability sample of cities and study the effects of factors such as the form of the publicity campaign on the
size of the preventive effects.
Third, the post-intervention periods were all relatively short,
ranging from twenty-four months for Detroit to sixty-three months
for assaults and robberies in the Florida cities. Our analysis thus
addresses only short-term changes, and it does not allow inferences
about the impact over a long period. The effects of the laws may
decay, and it would be desirable to extend the study periods to examine this possibility.
Finally, we do not know what features of the policy are responsible for the preventive effects. Given the evidence that preventive
effects exist, future research also should investigate the specific behavioral mechanisms responsible for the effects, factors that influence their magnitude and their temporal trajectory.
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Table 1
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS FOR HOMICIDE IN Six CrrIEs

City

Parameter

Gun

Other

Homicide

Homicide

Case Studies: Intervention Estimates
Detroit
Jacksonville
Tampa
Miami

to
d
C0O
d
(0o
d
0o0
d

Pittsburgh

0o

Philadelphia

d
0o
d

All Cities

Meta-Analysis: Variance Components Model
y
-. 6904
0

y/o
T

X2 (5 df)
coo
d
y

- 10.5700*
-1.3893
- .8577
- .3058
- 1.1950*
-. 6165
-. 3441
-. 1253
- 1.0700*
-. 4613
-6.8300*
-1.2973

.2108
-3.28*
.2225
28.79*

Impact-estimate from intervention model
Standardized impact-estimate
Grand mean standardized effect
Standard error of grand mean standardized effect
T2=
Estimate of variance of parameters
X = Test ofH o : T = 0
* p < .05
=
=
=
=

.0016
.0049
.1822
.0968
.1167
.0875
.8031
.3258
-. 3500
-. 1772
-2.2500*
-. 5507
- .0316
.1236
-. 26
.0516
11.47*
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Table 2
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS FOR ASSAULT

Jurisdiction

Parameter

Gun
Assault

Other
Assault

Case Studies: Intervention Estimates
COo

Detroit

d

Jacksonville

(0o

Tampa

d
(0o

d

-20.9500*
-1.8830
10.2400*

1.1862
-9.5400

Miami

00o

Pennsylvania

d
(00-

-. 6856
12.2500

d

-. 3862

Meta-Analysis: Variance Components Model
All Jurisdictions
y
-. 3641
UT
.4959
y
2
2

X (4 df)

coo
d
y
o,
,r
x

=
=
=
=
=

* p <

- .734

1.1913

130.87*

Impact-estimate from intervention model
Standardized impact-estimate
Grand mean standardized effect
Standard error of grand mean standardized effect
Estimate of variance of parameters

= Test of Ho:r = 0
.05

a Non-gun assault
b Knife assault
C Non-gun

weapon assault

.0327a
.3132

- .9967
-. 0506

-2.4650

b

.2937
-4.2750 b

-. 4732
-3.

6 72 0b

-. 3415
36.0700c
.6064

-. 0567
.2039
- .28

.1740

23.35*
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Table 3
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS FOR ROBBERY

Jurisdiction
Detroit
Jacksonville

Parameter

Armed

Unarmed

Robbery

Robbery

Case Studies: Intervention Estimates
Wo
.0778
.7044
d
(0o
2.5300
d
.1308

.0207
.1844
3.5580
.4136

Tampa

0)0

Miami

d
Wo
d

-.3415
1.9440
.0825

1.2361
30.1700*
1.4541

Pennsylvania

too
d

- 19.0300a
-. 2264

.0987

All Jurisdictions

-3.7230

Meta-Analysis: Variance Components Model
.0763
7
oY
.1826
y/cry
.42
.1351

1*

2

x (4 df)

21.75*

wo
d
y
my
,r

=
=
=
=
=

Impact-estimate from intervention model
Standardized impact-estimate
Grand mean standardized effect
Standard error of grand mean standardized effect
Estimate of variance of parameters

x2

=

Test ofH 0 : r = 0

* p < .05
a Gun robbery
b

Other weapon robbery

9.6590*

3.4590 b

.6809
.2787
2.44*
.3539

45.68*

